Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Ariston and Gottfried Leibniz

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480 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz]
Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz]
Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning [Leibniz]
Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz]
We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz]
Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge]
A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz]
For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz]
General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz]
Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz]
The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz]
One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz]
The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz]
True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz]
Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz]
Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz]
Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz]
Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz]
I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz]
A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz]
God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz]
Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette]
There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz]
Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
What is not active is nothing [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz]
Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley]
Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz]
A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]
Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz]
Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz]
A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz]
The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz]
The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer]
Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz]
A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]
The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz]
Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz]
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz]
I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz]
A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz]
A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz]
The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz]
The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz]
All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz]
Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz]
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber]
The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz]
Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz]
The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz]
A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz]
Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz]
Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM]
To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz]
Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz]
Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz]
The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz]
The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz]
Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz]
Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
Substance is that which can act [Leibniz]
Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz]
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz]
Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz]
A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz]
A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz]
A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz]
Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz]
No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking]
Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz]
A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz]
Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz]
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré]
Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt]
Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz]
There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins]
We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz]
Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz]
I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz]
The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz]
Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz]
Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz]
All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz]
Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz]
Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz]
You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz]
The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz]
We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz]
The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz]
The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz]
We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz]
Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz]
Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz]
The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz]
Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz]
Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz]
The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz]
Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz]
The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz]
We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz]
Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz]
Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz]
True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz]
Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz]
We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz]
The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz]
Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner]
Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz]
Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz]
Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]
We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz]
I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz]
Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber]
Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz]
Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz]
There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz]
Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz]
Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz]
Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]
Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz]
God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz]
Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz]
Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz]
If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]
Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber]
The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz]
In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz]
Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz]
The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz]
All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz]
Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz]
Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz]
Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz]
Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz]
Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces' [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz]
Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz]
God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz]
God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz]
A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz]
The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz]
This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz]
Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz]
God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton]
The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz]
God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz]
Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz]
All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz]
The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]
Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz]
Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz]
Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz]
God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz]
How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz]
Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz]
Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]